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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Cosmo Fazio appeals the District Court’s denial of his 
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  In his motion, Fazio asserted that his plea 
counsel was ineffective because he failed to warn Fazio 
properly of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, 
as required by the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356 (2010). Notwithstanding plea counsel’s purported 
error, the plea agreement – which plea counsel reviewed with 
Fazio thoroughly – contained a waiver of collateral-attack 
rights and, inter alia, advised of the possibility that Fazio 
could face automatic removal from the United States as a 
result of the plea.  The District Court conducted a detailed 
colloquy, specifically reviewing these provisions of the plea 
agreement with Fazio and questioning him regarding his 
awareness that a consequence of his plea could be automatic 
removal.   This case requires us to determine the effect of the 
plea agreement’s provisions and the District Court’s colloquy 
on Fazio’s ineffective assistance claim and whether the 
collateral-attack waiver is enforceable.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Fazio's 




 On December 9, 2009, a federal grand jury sitting in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an eight-count 
indictment against Fazio and twelve co-defendants for their 
alleged involvement in a cocaine distribution network.  Fazio 
was charged only in Count One of the indictment with 
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conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 
five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
846.  On June 3, 2011, Fazio pleaded guilty to the lesser-
included offense of conspiring to distribute more than 200 
grams but fewer than 300 grams of cocaine.  Supplemental 
Appendix (“Supp. App.”) 1–2.  Fazio’s plea agreement 
contained the following provision: 
 
Cosmo Fazio waives the right to take a direct 
appeal from his conviction or sentence under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 or 18 U.S.C. § 3742, subject to 
the following exceptions: 
 
(a) If the United States appeals from the 
sentence, Cosmo Fazio may take a direct appeal 
from the sentence. 
 
(b) If (1) the sentence exceeds the applicable 
statutory limits set forth in the United States 
Code, or (2) the sentence unreasonably exceeds 
the guideline range determined by the Court 
under the Sentencing Guidelines, Cosmo Fazio 
may take a direct appeal from the sentence. 
 
Cosmo Fazio further waives the right to file a 
motion to vacate sentence, under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255, attacking his conviction or sentence, and 
the right to file any other collateral proceeding 
attacking his conviction or sentence. 
 
Supp. App. 3–4.  The plea agreement further stated: 
 
Cosmo Fazio recognizes that pleading guilty 
may have consequences with respect to his 
immigration status if he is not a citizen of the 
United States.  Under federal law, a broad 
range of crimes are removable offenses.  
Removal and other immigration consequences 
are the subject of a separate proceeding, 
however, and the defendant understands that 
no one, including his own attorney or the 
district court, can predict to a certainty the 
effect of his conviction on his immigration 
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status.  Defendant nevertheless affirms that he 
wants to plead guilty regardless of any 
immigration consequences that his plea may 
entail, even if the consequence is his automatic 
removal from the United States. 
 
Supp. App. 3.  Fazio was born and raised in Bari, Italy and 
immigrated to the United States in 1992, at the age of twenty-
three.  Supp. App. 27.  He is a permanent resident alien.  
Appendix (“App.”) 50. 
 
 At Fazio’s plea hearing, the District Court conducted a 
colloquy in open court.  It specifically questioned Fazio to 
make sure that he understood the appellate waiver provision 
of his plea agreement: 
 
THE COURT: Do you also understand 
ordinarily you or the government may have the 
right to appeal any sentence that I impose, 
however, I note in Paragraph A13 of your plea 
agreement, you and the government agreed that 
you would waive, again, that’s give up, your 
right to take a direct appeal from your 
conviction . . .   
 
Further, you’ve also waived the right to file a 
motion to vacate sentence under 28 United 
States Code, Section 2255 and the right to file 
any other collateral proceeding attacking your 
conviction or sentence, do you understand that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  Waivers of appeal are generally 
permissible if entered into knowingly and 
voluntarily unless they work a miscarriage of 
justice.  I have examined the record in this case, 
observed you and heard your responses to my 
questions in open court, and I find no basis for 




App. 26–28.  The District Court also questioned Fazio 
regarding the potential immigration consequences of his 
guilty plea: 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Fazio, in addition to the 
possible penalties of which I have advised you, 
because you are not a United States citizen, you 
will also face a risk of removal from the United 
States after you have served any sentence 
imposed by this Court. 
 
Under federal law, a broad range of crimes are 
removable offenses, including the offense to 
which you are pleading guilty.  Removal and 
other immigration consequences are the subject 
of a separate proceeding, however.  Do you 
understand that no one, including your attorney 
or me or the government’s attorney can predict 
to a certainty the effect of your conviction on 
your immigration status? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
THE COURT:  Now knowing this, do you 
nevertheless want to plead guilty regardless of 
any immigration consequences that your plea of 
guilty may entail, even if the consequence is 
your automatic removal from the United States? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
App. 22–23.  Fazio informed the District Court that he 
understood the nature of the offense to which he was pleading 
guilty.  App. 16, 28.  He also confirmed that he had reviewed 
the terms of the plea agreement with his attorney and 
understood those terms.  App. 17, 35.  The District Court 
found that Fazio was competent to plead guilty and that he 
was doing so knowingly and voluntarily.  App. 44–45.  
Accordingly, the court accepted his plea.   
 
 Fazio was represented by counsel at the time of his 
guilty plea.  His counsel was aware that Fazio was not an 
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American citizen.  App. 99.  His counsel testified that, prior 
to the plea hearing, he informed Fazio that there 
 
could be immigration consequences.  However, 
it was my opinion that he would be entitled to a 
hearing.  And given what I had learned of his 
family and friends and background, I was 
confident that with competent immigration 
counsel, being unaware of the law, that he stood 
a good chance of not being deported.  I certainly 
told him it was a possibility, however. 
 
App. 105.  In addition, he testified that he reviewed the plea 
agreement with Fazio “line by line,” including the provision 
regarding immigration consequences.  App. 106.  After 
reviewing that provision, he told Fazio that “there was 
certainly a chance he could be deported, but it was my 
opinion he would not be.”  App. 107. 
 
 After Fazio pleaded guilty, his wife became concerned 
about the possible immigration consequences of his 
conviction and contacted a law firm specializing in 
immigration law.  App. 54.  On June 13, 2011, ten days after 
the entry of his guilty plea, Fazio, his wife, a family friend, 
and his plea counsel met with immigration attorneys Mark 
Goldstein and Andrew Wood.  App. 55.  During that meeting, 
Goldstein stated that it was certain that Fazio would be 
deported because he had pleaded guilty to an aggravated 
felony.  App. 56.  Goldstein, Fazio, and Fazio’s wife 
discussed the possibility that Fazio might request a change to 
his plea agreement to attempt to avoid this consequence.  
Fazio’s plea counsel expressed that he had been unaware of 
the immigration consequences of the plea, that he had made a 
mistake, and that he would help Fazio rectify the situation.  
App. 56.  
 
 In July 2011, Fazio terminated his plea counsel and 
retained new counsel. App. 57–58.  On November 1, 2011, 
Fazio moved to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B).  Supp. App. 35–36.  
He argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel because his plea counsel failed 
to advise him properly regarding the immigration 
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consequences of his plea, as required by the Supreme Court in 
Padilla v. Kentucky.  Supp. App. 38.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, Fazio’s plea counsel testified that he told Fazio that 
he had “an absolute right to at least a hearing,” and that he 
“thought [Fazio] had a greater likelihood of staying in the 
country than being deported.”  App. 117.  Goldstein testified 
that the consequence of Fazio pleading guilty to an 
aggravated felony was that he would have no defense to 
deportation.  App. 76.  During cross-examination, Goldstein 
conceded that it was possible for someone who was convicted 
of the identical crime as Fazio to remain in the country if the 
person was provided with an S visa, given to some non-
citizens who provide assistance to law enforcement, App. 83–
86, or if there was a change in law, App. 91–92.  On 
December 27, 2011, the District Court denied Fazio’s motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that his attorney did not 
violate the standard in Padilla, and that even if he did, the 
Court’s plea colloquy cured any error.  Supp. App. 24, 40–41. 
 
 Following his sentencing, Fazio filed a direct appeal 
with this Court.  The Government moved to enforce the 
appellate waiver in Fazio’s plea agreement.  We summarily 
granted the Government’s motion to enforce the appellate 
waiver and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. 
 
 On April 9, 2013, Fazio was issued a Form I-862, 
Notice to Appear, by the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement of the United States Department of Homeland 
Security, placing him in removal proceedings.  App. 120.  
 
 Fazio filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on April 
11, 2013, again asserting that his plea counsel violated 
Padilla.  The Government moved to enforce the collateral-
attack waiver in Fazio’s plea agreement.  The District Court 
granted the Government’s motion and denied Fazio’s § 2255 
motion.  App. 7.  
 
 Fazio filed a timely notice of appeal.  On October 10, 
2013, this Court granted a certificate of appealability and 
directed the parties to address the following issues:  (1) 
whether the District Court erred in enforcing Fazio’s 
collateral-attack waiver; and (2) whether Fazio was entitled to 






 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 2255(d), and we have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the validity of a collateral-attack waiver de novo.  
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001).  
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s legal 
conclusions in ruling on a habeas corpus petition and apply a 
clearly erroneous standard in reviewing its factual findings.  
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 




 The threshold issue in this appeal is whether the 
District Court erred in enforcing the collateral-attack waiver 
in Fazio’s plea agreement.  “A criminal defendant may 
knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most 
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.”  
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995).  
Further, a defendant may waive the statutory right to appeal if 
he does so with knowledge of the nature and consequences of 
the waiver.  Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561.  Thus, we will enforce 
appellate or collateral-attack waivers when they are entered 
into knowingly and voluntarily and their enforcement does 
not work a miscarriage of justice.  See United States v. Erwin, 
765 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2014); Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561 
(“[W]aivers of appeals, if entered into knowingly and 
voluntarily, are valid.”).  Fazio argues that the collateral-
attack waiver in his plea agreement was not made knowingly 
and voluntarily and that enforcement of the collateral-attack 
waiver would constitute a miscarriage of justice.1   
                                              
1 Fazio advances an additional argument that we should not 
enforce collateral-attack waivers because they are contrary to 
public policy and procedurally unconscionable as a result of 
the Government’s excessive bargaining power during plea 
negotiations.  We have previously noted the “benefits of such 
waivers to the defendant, government and court system,” and 
thus “have refused to find waivers of appeal rights violative 






 We consider first whether Fazio entered into the plea 
agreement knowingly and voluntarily.  His plea agreement 
clearly includes a broad appellate waiver that applies to both 
direct appeal and collateral-attack rights.  Counsel explained 
the waiver to Fazio and he signed the agreement, 
acknowledging that he understood its terms.  Further, the 
District Court asked Fazio at the plea colloquy whether he 
had been coerced into entering the plea agreement and 
discussed its terms with him.  The District Court ultimately 
found that Fazio was competent to plead guilty and did so 
knowing the consequences of his plea.  We conclude that it 
did not err in finding that Fazio entered into the plea 




  As Fazio’s plea agreement was knowing and 
voluntary, the “appellate waiver must therefore be enforced 
unless we identify the unusual circumstance of an error 
amounting to a miscarriage of justice in his sentence.”  Erwin, 
765 F.3d at 226 (quotation marks omitted).  This 
determination depends on factors such as 
 
the clarity of the error, its gravity, its character 
(e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a 
sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), 
the impact of the error on the defendant, the 
impact of correcting the error on the 
government, and the extent to which the 
defendant acquiesced in the result. 
 
Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Fazio argues that enforcement of the waiver would 
work a miscarriage of justice because he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In United States v. Mabry, we noted 
                                                                                                     
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561).  We 




that a miscarriage of justice may exist in a case “raising 
allegations that counsel was ineffective or coercive in 
negotiating the very plea agreement that contained the 
waiver.”  536 F.3d at 243; cf. United States v. Monzon, 359 
F.3d 110, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The appeal waiver would 
be unenforceable if the record . . . revealed that the claim that 
the waiver was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel 
was meritorious. But if the record on appeal shows that that 
claim lacks merit, the appeal should be dismissed because the 
waiver should be enforced.”). 
 
 We analyze Fazio’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel under the Supreme Court’s two-prong test from 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Under the 
first prong of the Strickland test, Fazio must show “that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at 687.  Under the second, or 
“prejudice” prong, he must demonstrate that “there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  In the 
context of a guilty plea, the prejudice prong of the test 
requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial.”  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  We may consider the Strickland prongs 
in either order, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670, and, indeed, we 
have noted that it is often practical to consider the prejudice 
prong first. See United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  
 
 Fazio contends that his plea counsel was ineffective 
because he did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirements 
for counsel set forth in Padilla v. Kentucky.  He faults his 
plea counsel for advising him only that he would face a 
possibility of deportation when in fact his plea would result in 
almost certain deportation.  Fazio also states that, had he been 
provided with the proper legal advice, he would not have 




 In Padilla, defense counsel failed to advise his non-
citizen client of the immigration consequences of pleading 
guilty.  Counsel specifically told the defendant that “he did 
not have to worry about immigration status since he had been 
in the country so long.”  559 U.S. at 359 (quotation marks 
omitted).  The Supreme Court noted that there are “numerous 
situations in which the deportation consequences of a 
particular plea are unclear or uncertain” and that, in such 
situations, “a criminal defense attorney need do no more than 
advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may 
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”  Id. at 
369.  However, “when the deportation consequence is truly 
clear,” as it was in Padilla’s case because he had committed a 
removable offense, “the duty to give correct advice is equally 
clear.”  Id.  Padilla was entitled to be “advised . . . that his 
conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation,” id. at 360, and his defense counsel’s 
failure to meet this requirement was constitutionally deficient 
representation under the first prong of Strickland.  Id.  
 
 Following Padilla, we decided, in United States v. 
Orocio, that counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing 
to advise a non-citizen defendant that his guilty plea carried a 
risk of deportation.  645 F.3d 630, 642–43 (3d Cir. 2011), 
abrogated on other grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 1103 (2013).  Like the attorney in Padilla, defense 
counsel in Orocio completely failed to advise his client of the 
“near-certain removal consequence of pleading guilty to a 
controlled substance offense.”  Id. at 642.  And like the 
attorney in Padilla, defense counsel “affirmatively misled” his 
client, telling him that “he did not have to worry about 
immigration status.”  Id. at 641 (quotation marks omitted).  
We held that “the failure of defense counsel to warn a 
defendant that a plea would make the defendant eligible for 
removal is a constitutional defect in representation that 
satisfies the first prong of the Strickland test.”  Id. at 641. 
 
 Unlike defense counsel in Padilla and Orocio, Fazio’s 
plea counsel did inform him that there “could be immigration 
consequences,” App. 105, to pleading guilty.  He conducted a 
“careful and thorough” review of the plea agreement with 
Fazio, including a review of the provision explaining the 
possible immigration consequences of Fazio’s plea.  Yet plea 
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counsel did not inform Fazio that the plea made him subject 
to automatic deportation, as is required under Padilla in cases 
like Fazio’s where the immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea are clear.2  While Fazio’s plea counsel stated that it 
would be more likely than not that Fazio could remain in the 
United States, it is clear that Fazio was subject to automatic 
removal as a result of his plea. 
 
 However, we need not reach the issue of whether 
Fazio’s plea counsel’s advice constituted deficient 
performance under Strickland.  Any error in that advice was 
remedied by the District Court’s in-depth colloquy and the 
language of the plea agreement itself, and so Fazio was not 
prejudiced.3  
 
 In United States v. Shedrick, the defendant’s plea 
agreement stated that his maximum potential sentence was 
ten years of imprisonment and that his actual sentence would 
be left to the discretion of the court after both he and the 
Government had an opportunity to argue “the applicability of 
any other provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, including . . 
. adjustments and departures.”  493 F.3d 292, 295 (3d Cir. 
2007). At the plea colloquy, the district court repeated that 
                                              
2 In Orocio, counsel told the defendant that he did not have to 
worry about immigration consequences at all.  We therefore 
did not need to reach the distinction drawn in Padilla between 
what is required in cases where the immigration 
consequences of a plea are clear (accurate advice) and what is 
required in cases where those consequences are unclear 
(advice that there is a risk of such consequences).  Here, the 
Government does not contest that it was clear that Fazio’s 
plea made him subject to automatic deportation.  Instead, the 
Government emphasizes that there was some possibility that 
Fazio’s guilty plea would not actually lead to his removal due 
to an intervening change in law or the grant of an S visa. 
  
3 Fazio’s claim of prejudice is further undermined by the fact 
that he did not testify at the evidentiary hearing in the District 
Court.  In the absence of such testimony, there is little 
affirmative evidence in the record that he would have rejected 




Shedrick’s maximum sentence under the plea agreement was 
ten years and that his actual sentence would be determined by 
the court.  Id. at 295–96.  At sentencing, the court ultimately 
granted the Government’s request for a four-level 
enhancement and eight-level departure due to certain 
characteristics of Shedrick’s offense.  Id. at 297.  Shedrick 
received a sentence of 96 months of imprisonment followed 
by three years of supervised release.  Id. 
 
 He later filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea 
process for defense counsel’s “failure to advise him about a 
potential enhancement or upward departure at sentencing.” Id. 
at 299.  We noted that “all that the law requires is that the 
defendant be informed of his/her exposure in pleading 
guilty,” and that it “does not require that a defendant be given 
a reasonably accurate ‘best guess’ as to what his/her actual 
sentence will be.”  Id. at 299 (quoting United States v. 
Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 492 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Shedrick 
was therefore entitled only to know that his maximum 
possible sentence was ten years.  We explained that “an 
erroneous sentencing prediction by counsel is not ineffective 
assistance of counsel where . . . an adequate plea hearing was 
conducted.”  Id.  We held that any erroneous sentencing 
information allegedly provided by counsel was therefore 
“corrected by the written plea agreement and the detailed in-
court plea colloquy,” both of which made clear that his 
maximum possible sentence was ten years.  Id. at 300.  
Shedrick was entitled to know his exposure in pleading guilty 
and he received that information, at least in the plea colloquy 
and plea agreement, if not also from defense counsel. 
 
 Fazio was entitled to be “advised . . . that his 
conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation.”  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.  This risk 
was made clear in both his plea agreement and during the plea 
colloquy.  The plea agreement stated that Fazio wanted “to 
plead guilty regardless of any immigration consequences that 
his plea may entail, even if the consequence is his automatic 
removal from the United States.”  Supp. App. 3.  During the 
plea colloquy, the District Court inquired of Fazio that, 
“knowing this [risk], do you nevertheless want to plead guilty 
regardless of any immigration consequences that your plea of 
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guilty may entail, even if the consequence is your automatic 
removal from the United States?”  App. 23.  Fazio responded 
affirmatively.   
 
 Like in Shedrick, any possible error in plea counsel’s 
advice to Fazio was cured by the plea agreement and at the 
plea colloquy.  Both made clear that Fazio was willing to 
plead guilty even if that plea would lead to automatic 
deportation, fulfilling the requirement that Fazio be informed 
of this risk under Padilla.  Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O) 
(requiring the court at a plea colloquy to inform and 
determine whether a defendant understands “that, if 
convicted, a defendant who is not a United States citizen may 
be removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and 
denied admission to the United States in the future”).  We 
hold that Fazio did not suffer prejudice as a result of any 
deficient performance by his counsel during the plea process 
and, therefore, Fazio is not entitled to relief on his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim.  We further hold that 
enforcement of the collateral-attack waiver in Fazio’s plea 
agreement would not constitute a miscarriage of justice.  We 
perceive no error in the District Court’s enforcement of that 




 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
